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1 Introduction
In recent years, contracts negotiated between manufacturers and retailers have become
increasingly complex. Supply contracts nowadays tend to include a variety of discounts
and lump-sum payments instead of simply stating a uniform unit price. Such contracts
are contentious from a competition policy perspective. In particular, upfront payments
paid by manufacturers to be included in a retailer’s product assortment have triggered
heated policy debates.1 Such payments include slotting fees for access to (sometimes
premium) shelf space, fees related to the introduction of new products, or listing and
pay-to-stay fees that suppliers pay to be or remain on the retailer’s (formal or informal)
list of potential suppliers. The magnitude of such payments is considerable. According
to a study published by the FTC (2003), “for those products with slotting allowances, the
average amount of slotting allowances (per item, per retailer, per metropolitan area) for
all five categories combined ranged from $2,313 to $21,768. (...) Most of the surveyed
suppliers reported that a nationwide introduction of a new grocery product would require
$1.5 to $2 million in slotting allowances.” In France, manufacturers have long been com-
plaining about the growing magnitude of slotting allowances and hidden rebates, and
these practices have been at the center of the debate about the 2005 reform of the 1996
Galland Act. Negotiations between a supplier and its retailers often goes far beyond the
discussion of a basic per-unit price. Retailers usually obtain or request various rebates
that are most of the time restropective, i.e. usually paid at the end of the quarter or
the year. The discount can be related to volume, such as quantity rebates or incentive
rebates paid if the annual sales (or turnover) have increased compared to the previous
years, or to promotional activities. As mentioned by the supermarket inquiry conducted
in 2000 by the UK Competition Commission, “some suppliers offered rebates for prompt
payments and for compliance with certain logistical factors, such as full pallets or lorry
loads, and EDI ordering.” Splitting the total margin made by a retailer on a product into
the observable margin (which includes all rebates written on the original invoice and the
retailer’s margin) and the hidden margin (which includes negotiated slotting allowances
and conditional rebates such as listing fees, quantity rebates or promotion related dis-
counts paid at the end of the year), the French producers’ association ILEC claimed that
the hidden margin represented on average 88 percent of the total margin made by French
supermarkets on grocery products in 1999.
While pro-competitive justifications have been brought forward for fees related to the
1See for example the reports by the FTC (2001, 2003) in the U.S. or the Competition Commission
(2000, 2007) in the U.K.
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allocation of shelf space,2 advertising or the introduction of new products,3 listing or
pay-to-stay fees are particularly contentious. The economic literature on listing fees and
more generally on slotting allowances has first focused on manufacturers’ incentives to
offer such payments. Shaffer (1991) shows that even perfectly competitive manufactur-
ers can dampen retail competition by offering wholesale prices above marginal cost and
compensate retailers by means of slotting allowances. Yet, in the grocery industry for
example, the general perception is that bargaining power has shifted towards large retail
chains in recent years.4 Large supermarket chains often account for a high share of a
manufacturer’s production: in the UK, even large manufacturers typically rely on their
main buyer for more than 30 percent of domestic sales. In contrast, the business of a lead-
ing manufacturer usually represents a very small proportion of business for each of the
major multiples. Finally, while large manufacturers certainly continue to possess a strong
bargaining position on some must-stock brands, this strength does not necessarily carry
over to other goods, since negotiations mostly take place on a product-by-product basis.5
Real-world evidence indicates that both the incidence and the magnitude of slotting al-
lowances are positively correlated with retailers’ buyer power, and that supply contracts
often become more complex as buyer power increases.6
However, the economic literature has mostly concentrated on situations where the
upstream firms had the bargaining power. A first result, derived by O’Brien and Shaffer
(1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998), is that two-part tariffs suffice to achieve joint
profit maximization (interbrand coordination) when rival manufacturers supply a com-
mon retailer. In such cases, the retailer plays the role of a “gatekeeper” for consumers and
fully internalizes, when wholesale prices are set equal to marginal cost, any contracting
externalities. Fixed fees can then be used to share the profit. Because it can choose which
product to carry, the retailer gets a strictly positive profit in equilibrium even though the
2Slotting fees are often considered to be an efficient way to allocate scarce shelf space (however, there is
some concern that large manufacturers may use such fees to exclude smaller competitors whose pockets
are not deep enough to match such offers — see Bloom et al. (2000), and Shaffer (2005) for a formal
analysis).
3Fees related to promotional activities can be a way to compensate a retailer for additional effort (see
e.g. Klein and Wright (2007)). Fees related to the introduction of a new product may serve risk-sharing,
signaling or screening purposes (see Kelly (1991)).
4See Inderst and Wey (2006) for more evidence on the retailers’ growing bargaining power in different
sectors both in Europe and in the US.
5See the provisional findings of the groceries inquiry published recently by the Competition Commis-
sion (2007).
6See the FTC (2001) staff report for instance. The Competition Commission (2000) states that “some
suppliers said that they regarded these charges as exploitation of the power differences between the retailer
and the supplier.”
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manufacturers have all the bargaining power in each bilateral negotiation. Nevertheless,
common agency always arises in equilibrium because the compensation required by a re-
tailer is fully determined by the rival manufacturer’s offer and thus cannot be directly
affected by a producer. Perfect interbrand coordination could fail to arise in the presence
of contracting externalities, in which case exclusion could even occur. Contracting exter-
nalities could arise for example from a restriction on contracts,7 or from third parties not
present at the contracting stage.8 Although O’Brien and Shaffer (1997) and Bernheim
and Whinston (1998) have focused on the case where manufacturers have the bargaining
power in their bilateral relations with the common agent, interbrand coordination is still
achieved (although the division of profit is now different) when the retailer has the ini-
tiative: once again, the retailer plays the role of a “gatekeeper” for consumers and fully
internalizes, by setting wholesale prices at cost, any contracting externalities. This also
remains the case when offers are private: since manufacturers supply at cost and get their
remuneration through fixed fees, there is no scope for opportunism. Inderst (2005) also
looks at the role of buyer power and slotting allowances in a context where manufacturers
supply a monopolist retailer. He shows that, when the retailer has a weak bargaining
power vis-a`-vis the manufacturers, the retailer might find it desirable to commit ex ante
to exclusivity thus transforming de facto upstream competition into an auction where
manufacturers bid on slotting allowances.
Perfect (intra-brand) coordination remains feasible with simple two-part tariffs when-
ever a common producer supplying rival retailers chooses the terms of the contracts. It
can simply offset the competitive pressure on retail prices by charging wholesale prices
above costs, so as to maintain consumer prices at the monopoly level, and recover any
remaining retail profit through fixed fees. Note however that this result only holds when
offers are public, since private contracting may induce the manufacturer to behave op-
portunistically. When making an offer to a retailer, the manufacturer does not take into
account the impact that the offer will have on the sales of competing retailers; it thus
has incentives to free-ride on the other retailers’ downstream margin. As shown by Hart
and Tirole (1990) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) in the case of Cournot downstream
competition, and by O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and Rey and Verge´ (2004) in the case
of Bertrand competition, this prevents the manufacturer from sustaining the monopoly
outcome. Rey and Verge´ (2004) also show that (under passive beliefs) the problem might
be so important that no common agency exists when the retailers are close competitors.9
7For instance, Mathewson and Winter (1987) consider a restriction to linear prices.
8For example, an incumbent manufacturer can sometimes profitably prevent efficient entry: see Aghion
and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000) and Comanor and Rey (2000).
9McAfee and Schwartz (1995) were the first to notice a (though very different) non-existence issue
when the number of retailers increases. Segal and Whinston (2003) note a similar existence problem when
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More recently, Martimort and Stole (2003) as well as Segal and Whinston (2003) have
analyzed bidding games where rival retailers simultaneously offer supply contracts to a
monopolist manufacturer. Assuming that the manufacturer eventually decides how much
to supply, they find that both retailers may be active in equilibrium but there always
remains some retail competition; full intrabrand coordination is therefore impossible. In
the case of relationships between manufacturers and retailers, it may however be more
realistic to postulate that the downstream firms are the ones choosing how much to
procure.
The latest development in this strand of literature is due to Marx and Shaffer (2007)
who consider a model of vertical negotiations where retailers have the initiative in de-
termining the terms of the contracts and the quantities ordered. They show that strong
retailers can exclude other retailers by offering “three-part tariffs” that include upfront
payments (slotting allowances), paid by the manufacturer even if the retailer does not
buy anything afterwards, and conditional fees, paid by the retailer only if it eventually
buys from the manufacturer. Indeed, in any candidate common agency equilibrium, the
manufacturer must be indifferent between accepting both offers or only one retailer’s offer,
otherwise that retailer could offer a smaller fixed fee. However, that retailer would be bet-
ter off if the manufacturer refused its rival’s offer, since it would receive or pay the same
fee but obtain greater variable profits (since sales would expand and retail margins are
positive whenever retail competition is imperfect, due, e.g., to differentiation, competition
in quantities or capacity constraints). The retailer thus has an incentive to deviate to an
exclusive dealing situation.10 Marx and Shaffer (2007) then show that a large conditional
payment can be used to achieve exclusivity (if the manufacturer were to decide to accept
both offers or to sell the rival’s product, it would have to forego this large payment), while
the slotting fee is used to share profit. Their analysis suggests that upfront payments can
play a key role in foreclosure strategies, slotting fees being used as a way to get around
existing legislation against explicit exclusive dealing contracts.
In contrast to Marx and Shaffer (2007), we show in this paper that foreclosure does
not arise when retailers can offer contracts that are contingent on whether the retailer gets
exclusivity or not. Assuming, as in Bernheim and Whinston (1998), that contracts can
be contingent on the market structure might be a reasonable assumption in the context
of relationships between a manufacturer and its retailers. First, one might indeed expect
firms to discuss the terms for both options. Second, even when firms negotiate a non-
the manufacturer faces nonconstant returns to scale. See also Rey and Tirole (2007) for an overview of
this literature.
10Note that the coordination problem that arises in this setting is similar to that faced by a single
producer offering secret contracts to competing retailers.
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contingent contract, they do so with a given market configuration in mind, and would
probably renegotiate the terms of the contract if the actual configuration turned out not
to be as expected.11 In a framework similar to that of Marx and Shaffer (2007), where
rival retailers offer public take-it-or-leave-it contingent contracts to a single manufacturer,
we study the role of conditional (and upfront) payments in determining: (i) whether
exclusion is a profitable strategy for a retailer, and (ii) the price levels when both retailers
distribute the good. We show that there exist equilibria where firms achieve the integrated
monopoly outcome, and that the retailers’ preferred equilibrium gives each retailer its
entire contribution to the industry monopoly profits.
As we have already mentioned earlier, two-part tariffs would suffice to achieve the
industry monopoly outcome if the manufacturer had the bargaining power in each bilateral
negotiation with the retailers. When the retailers have the initiative, however, standard
two-part tariffs no longer yield monopoly prices and profits when both retailers are active,
since each retailer then has an incentive to lower its (wholesale) price and free-ride on its
rival’s downstream margin. By reducing the profits that can be achieved, this free-riding
may moreover lead to the exclusion of a retailer.
Conditioning fixed fees on actual trade contributes to protect retailers against such
free-riding since retailers can then “opt out” and waive the fixed fee if a rival tries to
undercut them. Upfront payments by the manufacturer can then be used to give ex ante
each retailer its contribution to the industry profits. Last, as we will see, each retailer
can discourage its rivals from deviating to exclusivity by making its non-exclusive offer
sufficiently more attractive than the exclusivity option.
We moreover show that upfront payments are not necessary to achieve full intrabrand
coordination. What really matters is the ability of retailers to protect themselves against
attempts to free-ride on their downstream margins, not the possibility to use slotting
allowances. Conditioning fixed fees on actual trade provides such a guarantee, but another
possibility would be to condition fixed payments on the retailer’s ability to sell more than
some minimum quantity, in which case negative upfront payments are no longer required.
This result holds in our model with contingent contracts, but also in the setting analyzed
by Marx and Shaffer (2007), in which only non-contingent offers are allowed. The strong
retailer can exclude the weak retailer by means of contract offers that do not include any
negative upfront payments. An important policy implication for competition authorities
is that banning slotting allowances can be expected to be ineffective, since retailers could
circumvent the ban by using an other form of (more sophisticated but legal) supply
contract and still achieve the same outcome.
11Indeed, contracts often stipulate a clause triggering renegotiation in case of a “material change in
circumstances.”
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the general framework and derives
upper bounds on retailers’ rents, which provide benchmarks for the rest of the analysis.
Section 3 shows that, in contrast to the polar case of upstream competitors dealing with
a common retailer, two-part tariffs do not suffice to maximize industry profits. We show
moreover that contracting externalities might be so high that only exclusive dealing equi-
libria exist. In section 4, we consider more general tariffs and first characterize contingent
three-part tariffs that generate the industry-profit maximizing outcome. We then show
how the same outcome can be replicated even if negative payments (i.e., payments by
the manufacturer to a retailer) are ruled out. Finally, section 5 discusses some policy
implications of our findings and concludes.
2 Framework and Preliminary Results
2.1 Framework
Two differentiated retailers, R1 and R2, can distribute the product of a manufacturer M .
The manufacturer produces at constant marginal cost c, while retailers incur no additional
distribution costs. Retailers have all the bargaining power in their bilateral relations with
the manufacturer; their interaction is therefore modeled as follows:
1. R1 and R2 simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it offers to M . Offers can be con-
tingent on exclusivity, that is, each retailer Ri offers a pair of contracts
(
CCi , C
E
i
)
where CCi and C
E
i respectively specify the terms of trade when the manufacturer
has accepted both offers or Ri’s offer only.
12 The offers are thus only contingent on
acceptance decisions.
2. M decides whether to accept both, only one, or none of the offers. All offers and
acceptance decisions are public.
3. The retailers with accepted contracts compete on the downstream market and the
relevant contracts are implemented.
We do not specify how competition takes place on the retail market; in particular,
our results are valid for quantity as well as price competition. Denoting by Pi (qi, q−i)
the inverse demand function at store i = 1, 2 when Ri and R−i sell qi and q−i units
respectively,13 the maximum profit that can be achieved by a fully integrated firmis equlal
12Throughout the paper, superscripts C and E respectively refer to common agency and exclusive
dealing situations.
13Throughout the paper, the notation “−i” refers to retailer i’s rival.
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to:
ΠM = max
(q1,q2)
{(P1 (q1, q2)− c) q1 + (P2 (q2, q1)− c) q2} .
When only Ri is active, the maximum profit is:
Πmi = max
qi
{(Pi (qi, 0)− c) qi} .
We assume that the two retailers are imperfect substitutes and, without loss of generality,
that R1 alone is at least as profitable as R2 alone:
Πm1 +Π
m
2 > Π
M > Πm1 ≥ Π
m
2 .
At this point, let us discuss the main assumptions underlying our model. First, the
above strict inequalities rule out the cases where retailers serve independent markets or are
instead perfect substitutes. Both cases would be trivial: two-part tariffs suffice to achieve
the monopoly outcome when the markets are independent, while exclusive dealing is
efficient (and monopoly profits are easily achieved) when there is perfect substitutability.
Second, we have assumed that contracts are public. Since the manufacturer observes
both offers, no problem of opportunism arises in the first two stages. However, if retailers
did not observe each other’s contracts before competing on the product market, each
retailer would have an incentive to free-ride on the other, thereby limiting the retailers’
ability to avoid competition.
Last, as already mentioned, we allow contracts to be contingent on exclusivity. This
reflects the fact that in practice firms may indeed explore both options, and can also
be viewed as a “short-cut” capturing the possibility of renegotiation in case of a refusal
to deal. An alternative approach would be to introduce an explicit dynamic multilateral
framework: this is for example the route followed by de Fontenay and Gans (2005a) and
Bedre (2006), who use Stole and Zwiebel’s (1996) model of sequential bilateral bargaining,
with renegotiation (“from scratch”) in a case a relationship breaks-down. De Fontenay
and Gans (2005a) consider secret contracts that stipulate a given quantity for a given
total price, and show that while the outcome is bilaterally efficient, it fails to maximize
the industry profits.14 In contrast, Bedre (2006) shows that public contracts combining
upfront payments and conditional fixed fees, but not necessarily contingent on exclusivity,
achieve joint-profit maximization. Non-renegotiable contingent contracts however allow
the first contracting retailer to obtain a larger share of the profits (at the expense of the
other retailer) than non-contingent contracts subject to renegotiation.
14De Fontenay and Gans (2005b) use a similar approach to study the impact of vertical integration.
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2.2 Common Agency Profits
Before turning to specific contractual relationships, it is useful to derive bounds on the
equilibrium payoffs in common agency situations, that is, in situations where both retailers
are active. We will only assume here that, if retailer R−i is inactive, the pair Ri−M can
achieve the bilateral monopoly profit Πmi and share it as desired.
15 We denote by ΠC the
equilibrium industry profit under common agency, and by piC1 , pi
C
2 and pi
C
M , respectively,
the retailers’ and the manufacturer’s equilibrium profits. By definition, ΠC cannot exceed
the industry monopoly profit ΠM ; it may however be lower if contracting externalities
prevent joint profit maximization.
In any common agency equilibrium, the joint profit of a given vertical pair Ri −M
cannnot be lower than the bilateral profit it could achieve by excluding R−i since Ri
could otherwise profitably deviate by offering an exclusive dealing contract generating the
bilateral monopoly profit and leaving a slightly higher payoff to M .16 Conversely, there
is no profitable deviation to exclusivity if Ri and M jointly get at least their bilateral
monopoly profit: for i = 1, 2,
piCi + pi
C
M ≥ Π
m
i . (1)
This, in turn, implies that a retailer cannot earn more than its contribution to total
profits: since by definition, piCi +pi
C
M = Π
C−piC
−i, condition (1) (written for “− i”) implies
that, for i = 1, 2,
piCi ≤ Π
C − Πm
−i. (2)
These upper bounds imply that the manufacturer’s equilibrium payoff piCM is always pos-
itive:
piCM = Π
C − piC1 − pi
C
2
≥ ΠC −
(
ΠC − Πm2
)
−
(
ΠC − Πm1
)
= Πm1 +Π
m
2 − Π
C
≥ Πm1 +Π
m
2 − Π
M > 0.
M ’s participation constraint is thus strictly satisfied in any common agency equilibrium.
Since individual rationality also requires piCi ≥ 0 for all i, condition (2) implies that a
15Two-part tariffs, for example, can achieve this. The discussion below parallels that of Bernheim and
Whinston (1998) who consider the case where upstream firms compete for a downstream monopolist.
16For example, a two-part tariff Ti (qi) = Fi + cqi, with Fi just above pi
C
M
conditional on exclusivity,
would do.
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common agency equilibrium can only exist if it is more profitable than exclusive dealing,
namely if:
ΠC ≥ Πm1 . (3)
We can further reduce the set of possible equilibrium payoffs by restricting attention
to trembling-hand perfect equilibria, thus ruling out exclusive offers that would be un-
profitable if mistakenly accepted. In particular, the manufacturer must be indifferent
between accepting both offers (common agency) or accepting one of the exclusive offers
only. Since the profit realized in an exclusive deal with R2 cannot exceed Π
m
2 , this is the
maximum that M can obtain in any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Therefore, if
there exists a (trembling-hand perfect) common agency equilibrium generating industry
profits equal to ΠC , the different parties’ profits must satisfy:
piCM ∈
[
Πm1 +Π
m
2 −Π
C ,Πm2
]
, piC1 ∈
[
Πm1 − Π
m
2 ,Π
C −Πm2
]
and piC2 ∈
[
0,ΠC −Πm1
]
. (4)
3 Two-Part Tariffs
In this section, we consider two-part tariffs that are contingent on the market structure
(common agency or exclusivity), of the form:
T ki (q) = U
k
i + w
k
i q, for q ≥ 0 and k = C,E ,
and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common agency
equilibrium in this context.
3.1 Exclusive Dealing
First note that there always exists an exclusive dealing equilibrium. Clearly, if Ri insists
on exclusivity (e.g., by offering only exclusivity, or by degrading its non-exclusive option),
R−i cannot do better than also insist on exclusivity. In addition, if M sells at cost
exclusively to Ri (wi = c, w−i = +∞, say), Ri will maximize its joint profit with M , thus
generating a total profit equal to Πmi . The fixed fee U
E
i can then be used to share this
profit as desired. As a result:
Lemma 1 There always exists an exclusive dealing equilibrium:
• If Πm1 > Π
m
2 , in any such equilibrium R1 is the active retailer while R2 gets zero
profit; among these equilibria, the unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, which
is also the most favorable to the retailers, yields Πm1 −Π
m
2 for R1 and Π
m
2 for M .
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• If Πm1 = Π
m
2 , there exist two exclusive dealing equilibria, where either retailer is
active. In both cases, retailers earn zero profits and M gets Πm2 .
Proof. If one retailer offers only an exclusive dealing contract, then the other retailer
cannot gain by making a non-exclusive offer. Hence, without loss of generality we can
restrict attention to equilibria in which both retailers only offer exclusive dealing contracts.
In any such equilibrium, the joint profit of the manufacturer and the active retailer,
Ri, must be maximized; otherwise Ri could profitably deviate to a different exclusive
dealing contract. Ri therefore sets the wholesale price wi equal to marginal cost c, and
equilibrium industry profits are Πmi .
For Πm1 > Π
m
2 , R2 cannot be the exclusive retailer, since R1 could outbid any ex-
clusive deal. In addition, R1’s equilibrium fixed fee U
E
1 must be in the range [Π
m
2 ,Π
m
1 ]:
R2 would outbid R1’s offer if U
E
1 < Π
m
2 ; and if U
E
1 > Π
m
1 , R1 would be better-off not
offering any contract at all. Conversely, any UE1 ∈ [Π
m
2 ,Π
m
1 ] can sustain an exclusive deal-
ing equilibrium in which both retailers offer (only) the same exclusive dealing contract
TEi (q) = U
E
1 + cq. The best equilibrium for R1 (and thus the Pareto-undominated equi-
librium for both retailers) is such that UE1 = Π
m
2 , in which case R1’s payoff is Π
m
1 − Π
m
2 .
In addition, for UE1 > Π
m
2 , R2’s equilibrium offer is unprofitable and would thus not be
made if it could be mistakenly accepted; therefore, such equilibria are not trembling-hand
perfect.
For Πm1 = Π
m
2 , the same reasoning implies that exclusive dealing offers must be efficient(
wEi = c
)
and yield exactly Πm2 to M : it would be unprofitable for the active retailer to
offer a higher fixed fee, and its rival could outbid any lower fixed fee. Conversely, it is an
equilibrium for both retailers to offer the exclusive dealing contract TEi (q) = Π
m
2 + cq.
Thus, there always exists an exclusive dealing equilibrium where the more efficient
retailer, R1, outbids its rival and generates the maximal bilateral profit, Π
m
1 . When both
retailers are equally efficient, standard competition a` la Bertrand leaves all the profit to
M ; otherwise, R1 can earn up to its contribution to the bilateral profit, Π
m
1 −Π
m
2 .
17
3.2 Common Agency
For the sake of exposition, we assume from now on that, for any pair of wholesale prices
(w1, w2), there is a unique retail equilibrium and denote the continuation flow profits for
Ri, M and the entire industry, respectively, by pii (w1, w2), piM (w1, w2) and Π (w1, w2).
Unlike under exclusivity, marginal cost pricing cannot implement the monopoly out-
come when both retailers are active: if wi = c for all i, retail competition leads to prices
17The situation is formally the same as Bertrand competition between asymmetric firms, where one
firm has a lower cost or offers a higher quality.
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below their monopoly levels. Wholesale prices above cost could however be used to offset
the impact of retail competition. In what follows, we assume that high enough wholesale
prices would indeed sustain the monopoly outcome:18
Assumption A1. There exist wholesale prices (w1, w2) that sustain the monopoly out-
come and thus generate the monopoly profits: Π (w1, w2) = Π
M .
Thus, ifM could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the retailers, it would choose (w1, w2)
and set fixed fees so as to recover retail margins: in this way, M would generate and ap-
propriate the monopoly profits ΠM .19 When retailers have the bargaining power, however,
the industry monopoly outcome cannot be an equilibrium: while each retailer can inter-
nalize any impact of its own price on the profit thatM makes on sales (including those to
the rival retailer), it still has an incentive to “free-ride” on its rival’s downstream margin.
Suppose that R−i offers a non-exclusive tariff such that w
C
−i = w−i ; offering w
C
i = wi
would then maximize industry profits, but not the bilateral joint profits of Ri and M ,
given by:
UC
−i + piM (w1, w2) + pii (w1, w2) = U
C
−i +Π(w1, w2)− pi−i (w1, w2) .
Hence, whenever the wholesale price wi affects the rival retailer’s profit pi−i (w1, w2), the
equilibrium cannot yield the industry monopoly outcome. To fix ideas, we will suppose in
what follows that a retailer always benefits from an increase in its rival’s wholesale price,
that is:
Assumption A2. For i = 1, 2,
∂pi−i (w1, w2)
∂wi
> 0.
A simple revealed preference argument then shows that, in response to wC
−i = w−i , Ri
would offer a wholesale price wCi < wi (adjusting the fixed fee U
C
i so as to absorb any
impact on M ’s profit).
More generally, this reasoning implies that, in any equilibrium where both retailers
are active, the wholesale price wCi must maximize the bilateral profit that Ri can achieve
withM , given the wholesale price wC
−i. That is, the equilibrium wholesale prices
(
wC1 , w
C
2
)
must satisfy:
wCi =W
BR
i (w
C
−i) , for i = 1, 2, (5)
18This is for example the case if the equilibrium outcome (quantities or prices for instance) varies
continuously as wholesale prices increase. It then suffices to note that setting wholesale prices at the
retail monopoly level would necessarily generates retail prices at least equal to that level.
19This is indeed an equilibrium when contract offers are public. Private offers give M the opportunity
to behave opportunistically, which in turn is likely to prevent M from sustaining the monopoly outcome.
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where the best reply function WBRi (w−i) is given by:
WBRi (w−i) = argmax
wi
{pii (w1, w2) + piM (w1, w2)}
= argmax
wi
{Π (w1, w2)− pi−i (w1, w2)} .
The system (5) has a unique solution in standard cases (e.g., when demand is linear and
firms compete in prices or quantities). For the sake of exposition, we will suppose that
the best reply optimization problems are well-behaved and that the system (5) has at
least one solution:20
Assumption A3. (i) For i = 1, 2, Π (w1, w2) − pi−i (w1, w2) is quasi-concave in wi and
achieves its maximum for wi = W
BR
i (w−i); and (ii) the system (5) has at least one
solution.
In what follows, we denote by (w˜1, w˜2) a solution of the system (5) for which the
industry profits are the largest, and by Π˜ ≡ Π(w˜1, w˜2) these profits. Note that A2 implies
WBRi (w−i) < wi, and thus (w˜1, w˜2) = (w1, w2) and Π˜ < Π
M .21
Two-part tariffs thus cannot implement the industry monopoly outcome: when both
retailers are active, contracting externalities prevent the retailers from using the manu-
facturer as a perfect coordination device. This lack of coordination may in turn keep one
retailer from being active in equilibrium. Indeed, from the preliminary analysis in section
2.2, both retailers can be active only if this generates higher profits than exclusive dealing,
that is, if:
Π˜ ≥ Πm1 . (6)
Since Π˜ < ΠM , condition (6) may be violated, in which case it cannot be that both
retailers are active in equilibrium, even though a fully integrated structure would opt for
both of them to be active.
Conversely, with contingent tariffs, condition (6) guarantees the existence of an equi-
librium in which both retailers are active and each of them earns its entire contribution
to equilibrium profits. To see this, suppose that each Ri offers:
• wCi = w˜i, so that industry profits are equal to Π˜,
• UCi = pii(w˜1, w˜2) −
[
Π˜−Πm
−i
]
so that Ri gets its contribution to industry profits,
piCi = Π˜− Π
m
−i ≥ 0 , while M gets pi
C
M = Π
m
1 +Π
m
2 − Π˜ > 0,
20If this is not the case, there is no common agency equilibrium in pure strategies.
21Even if A2 does not hold, Π˜ < ΠM whenever ∂pi−i (w1, w2) /∂wi = 0 for at least one retailer i.
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• wEi = c, so that industry profits would be equal to Π
m
i if this exclusive dealing offer
were accepted,
• UEi = pi
C
M = Π
m
1 +Π
m
2 − Π˜.
By construction, M earns a positive profit and is indifferent between accepting one
or both offers. In addition, wholesale prices are, by definition, such that no retailer can
benefit from deviating to another common agency outcome. Finally, it is straightforward
to check that no retailer can profitably deviate to an exclusive dealing arrangement, since
the equilibrium already gives each Ri −M pair
piCi + pi
C
M = Π
m
i .
Note that when this equilibrium exists (that is, when Π˜ ≥ Πm1 ), it is preferred by both
retailers to any exclusive dealing equilibrium. It is also preferred to any other equilibrium
where both retailers are active, since each retailer gets its entire contribution to the
industry profits. Finally, in the limit case where Π˜ = Πm1 , it is by construction the only
possible equilibrium where both retailers are active. The following proposition summarizes
this discussion:
Proposition 2 When contracts are restricted to (contingent) two-part tariffs, common
agency equilibria (i.e., equilibria where both retailers are active) exist if and only if Π˜ ≥
Πm1 , in which case:
• industry profits are Π˜ < ΠM ;
• if Π˜ > Πm1 , then both retailers prefer the common agency equilibrium in which each
Ri earns its entire contribution to industry profits, Π˜− Π
m
−i , while the manufacturer
earns Πm1 +Π
m
2 − Π˜ , to all other equilibria;
• if Π˜ = Πm1 , then the unique common agency equilibrium is payoff equivalent to the
retailers’ preferred exclusive dealing equilibrium.
Thus, in contrast to the case of non-contingent contracts studied by Marx and Shaffer
(2007) both retailers may well be active in equilibrium.22 Contingent contracts help ensur-
ing thatM gets the same profit with either exclusive dealing offer as with the equilibrium
“non-exclusive” offers, which in turn reduces the scope for deviations to exclusivity. Con-
tingent two-part tariffs however do not allow the retailers to use their common supplier
22Moreover, at least one pure strategy equilibrium exists even we restrict our attention to two-part
tariffs.
14
so as to coordinate their behavior in the product market, and industry profits are thus
never maximized.
Let us now focus on common agency equilibria (i.e. restricting attention to Π˜ ≥ Πm1 )
and compare the equilibrium retail prices with the industry profit maximizing prices
(“monopoly prices”). In order to compare these prices, we make additional assumptions
on the profit functions:
Assumption A4. Wholesale prices are strategic complements (i.e.,
(
WBRi
)
′
> 0), the
wholesale price equilibrium is “stable” (i.e.,
(
WBR1
)
′
(
WBR2
)
′
< 1), and an increase in
either wholesale price increases both retail prices and reduces both retail quantities.
In any common agency equilibrium, each retailer Ri free-rides on its rival’s downstream
margin, leading to a wholesale price wi =W
BR
i (w−i) lower than what would maximize the
industry profit. When the best-responses WBRi (.) satisfy the strategic complementarity
and stability assumptions, it is straightforward to check that the equilibrium wholesale
prices lie below the levels that would sustain the monopoly outcome (i.e., w˜i < w
M
i ),
leading to retail prices that are also lower than the monopoly level:
Proposition 3 Under assumption A4, when contracts are restricted to (contingent) two-
part tariffs, retail prices are lower than monopoly prices in any common agency equilib-
rium.
4 Non-Linear Tariffs
As shown in the previous section, contingent two-part tariffs do not suffice to ensure
the existence of a common agency equilibrium. Moreover, even when such an equilib-
rium exists, industry profits are not maximized. We now show that restricting attention
to two-part tariffs is not innocuous, and try to understand which ingredients are neces-
sary in order to achieve monopoly prices and profits. In particular, as we will see, even
relatively simple tariffs suffice to sustain a common agency equilibrium with monopoly
prices. Moreover, the retailers’ preferred equilibrium is then one where both retailers sell
at monopoly prices.
4.1 Large Responses to Small Deviations
We first note that retailers cannot achieve full coordination as long as, as in the case
of two-part tariffs, an attempt by one retailer to change its quantity induces a smooth
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adjustment of its rival’s behavior on the downstream market.23 To see this, suppose for
instance that retailers compete in quantities and let ρi (qi, q−i) = Pi (qi, q−i) qi denote the
revenue generated by Ri’s quantity. When Ri deviates and modifies the contracts it offers
to M , the retail equilibrium, i.e. the quantities sold on the downstream market by both
retailers are affected. However, since it is always possible to modify the implemented
tariff TCi so as to induce a quantity qi (e.g. through simple “point tariffs” specifying a
fixed price for an imposed quantity), it is simpler to consider the impact of a change in
qi (rather than Ti) on Ri and M ’s joint profits, piRi−M . Assuming that R−i’s reaction
function qBR
−i (qi) is differentiable, this change writes as:
∂piRi−M
∂qi
=
∂ρi
∂qi
− c +
(
∂ρi
∂q−i
− c+
dTC
−i
dq−i
)
dqBR
−i
dqi
.
Given that q−i has been chosen optimally by R−i, we have:
dTC
−i
dq−i
=
∂ρ
−i
∂q−i
,
and therefore:
∂piRi−M
∂qi
=
∂ρi
∂qi
− c+
(
∂ρi
∂q−i
+
∂ρ
−i
∂q−i
− c
)
dqBR
−i
dqi
.
The monopoly quantities
(
qMi , q
M
−i
)
, however, solve the equations:
∂ρi
∂qi
+
∂ρ
−i
∂qi
− c = 0, for i = 1, 2,
and thus:
∂piRi−M
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
(qmi ,qm−i)
= −
∂ρ
−i
∂qi
= 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium tariffs cannot induce the monopoly outcome, since the quantity
qMi would not maximize the joint profit of the pair Ri−M . In order to generate the efficient
outcome (from the firms’ point of view), a small change in Ri’s contract must therefore
induce a “large” (i.e. discontinuous) change in R−i’s behavior.
4.2 Three-Part Tariffs
Such a discontinuous change can be achieved in our framework by “three-part tariffs”
that combine classic two-part tariffs with conditional fixed payments. These tariffs, used
by Marx and Shaffer (2007) to show that general enough (but non-contingent) non-linear
23We thank Mike Whinston for useful comments that provided the basis for the following discussion.
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tariffs lead to exclusivity, differ from two-part tariffs only through the fact that part of
the fixed fee is conditional on actually buying the product. The tariffs are of the form:
T ki (qi) =
{
Uki if qi = 0
Uki + F
k
i + w
k
i qi if qi > 0
(i = 1, 2; k = C,E),
where F ki denotes the conditional fee paid by the retailer only if it actually buys a positive
quantity from the manufacturer.
With such contracts, a “large” (i.e. discontinuous) reaction by R−i can be achieved by
setting the conditional fee Fi equal to the retail profit expected from product i. Retailers’
profits, gross of the upfront payments, are then zero in equilibrium. Any attempt by
Ri and M to free-ride on R−i’s sales, would induce R−i to opt out (i.e., q
BR
−i drops to
zero) and waive the fee FC
−i. This renders such deviation unprofitable for Ri and M .
In what follows, we show that tariffs of this form suffice indeed to create the necessary
discontinuity in the retailers’ behavior and implement the industry monopoly profit ΠM .
Such tariffs also allow each retailer Ri to earn its entire contribution to these profits,
ΠM − Πm
−i . To see this, consider the following contracts: for i = 1, 2,
• UCi = −
[
ΠM −Πm
−i
]
< 0, so that retailers obtain their contributions to the industry
profits through upfront payments;
• wCi = wi, so that wholesale prices sustain monopoly prices and quantities;
• FCi = pii(w1, w2), so that M recovers ex post all retail margins and thus gets
Πm1 +Π
m
2 −Π
M ;
• wEi = c and F
E
i +U
E
i = Π
m
1 +Π
m
2 −Π
M ,24 so thatM could also secure its equilibrium
profit by dealing exclusively with either retailer.
M is willing to accept both contracts (it earns the same profit by accepting either
one or both offers), and accepting both contracts induces the retailers to implement the
monopoly outcome. Wholesale prices generate monopoly prices and quantities if both
retailers buy at these prices, and they are indeed willing to buy since conditional payments
do not exceed their corresponding profits. Finally, the upfront payments give each retailer
its contribution to joint profits.
Therefore, if both contracts are proposed, they are accepted by M and yield the
monopoly outcome. It is moreover easy to check that no retailer has an incentive to offer
any alternative contract (even outside the class of three-part tariffs):
24Whether fixed fees are upfront or conditional does not matter for the exclusive dealing offers, since
the retailer always finds it profitable to sell a positive quantity.
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• Since M can also obtain its profit piCM by opting for either retailer’s exclusive offer,
Ri must increase its joint profits with M in order to benefit from a deviation.
• These joint profits are already equal to Πmi in the candidate equilibrium (since R−i
gets exactly ΠM −Πmi ); therefore, Ri cannot lureM into a more profitable exclusive
dealing arrangement.
• Bilateral profits cannot be higher than Πmi in any common agency situation either,
since total industry profits cannot exceed ΠM , and R−i can always secure at least
−UCi = Π
M −Πmi by not selling in the last stage.
The above contracts thus constitute an equilibrium where both retailers are active and
each retailer Ri earns its maximal achievable profit, Π
M −Πm
−i . Both retailers therefore
prefer this equilibrium to any other exclusive dealing or common agency equilibrium. The
following proposition summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 4 When retailers can offer three-part tariffs or more general contracts, there
exists an equilibrium in which both retailers are active, industry profits are at the monopoly
level, and each retailer earns its entire contribution to these profits.
Out of all equilibria (with either one or both retailers being active), both retailers prefer
this equilibrium; this equilibrium can be sustained by three-part tariffs where M pays an
initial slotting allowance of ΠM −Πm
−i to each retailer Ri, and each retailer Ri then pays
a wholesale price equal to wi for each unit it buys as well as a conditional fee equal to its
variable profit piCi (w1, w2).
Conditional payments can hence be used to protect retailers against rivals’ opportunis-
tic moves:25 if a retailer deviated to a lower wholesale price, then its rival would “opt
out” and waive the conditional payment to the manufacturer, which would reduce the
profitability of the deviation. To sustain the monopoly outcome, however, the conditional
fixed fees must be large (equal to all of the retailers’ variable profits); therefore, to get
their share of the profit, retailers must receive down payments from the manufacturer
(i.e., Ui < 0).
26 Proposition 4 thus shows how slotting allowances or other forms of down
payments can contribute to eliminate retail competition.
25As long as contracts are observed before retailers actually compete, conditional payments would
also solve the problem of opportunism in the framework of Hart and Tirole (1990), where a monopolist
manufacturer makes unobservable offers to competing retailers. Since conditional fixed fees give retailers
the opportunity to “exit” later on, retailers are willing to accept high (conditional) fixed fees, even if they
do not observe the offer made to their rivals.
26In principle, three-part tariffs can also sustain equilibria in which the manufacturer obtains up to all
of the industry profits, in which case upfront payments would be equal to 0. However, such equilibria rely
on unprofitable exclusive dealing offers and are therefore not trembling-hand perfect.
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Our results differ from those obtained in bidding games considered by Martimort
and Stole (2003) or Segal and Whinston (2003), where, as here, downstream firms offer
non-linear contracts to a common supplier, but it is the supplier that eventually chooses
the quantities to procure. Contracting externalities then always generate an inefficient
outcome for the firms. The reason is that, when the quantity qi is chosen byM rather than
by Ri, the negotiation over Ti (.) has no effect on q−i. Indeed, while retailers’ marginal
revenue depend on each other’s quantities, the supplier’s profit is separable in q1 and q2 :(
qR1 (T1, T2) , q
R
2 (T1, T2)
)
= argmax
(q1,q2)
[T1 (q1) + T2 (q2)− C (q1, q2)] ,
whenever the cost function is separable in q1 and q2 (i.e. C (q1, q2) = C1 (q1) +C2 (q2)).
27
Therefore, when negotiating Ti (.) , M and Ri maximize their joint profits, taking q−i as
given, and the outcome is necessarily inefficient from the point of view of the integrated
structure. More generally, when the manufacturer directly chooses quantities, retailers
play no strategic role once they have determined the terms of their contracts. As a result,
whether contracts are public or secret does not matter. Moreover, whether the terms are
set by the upstream or downstream parties has no impact on final prices: either way,
each vertical structure maximizes its joint profit, which results in the same equilibrium
prices.28
Our results also differ from those obtained by Marx and Shaffer (2007) who look at
the same situation as we do but restrict attention to non-contingent contracts. As al-
ready noted in the introduction, when retailers offer non-contingent (three-part) tariffs,
the manufacturer is indifferent (in any common agency equilibrium) between accepting
both offers or accepting one offer only, whereas the retailer would strictly prefer to break
that indifference in favor of exclusivity (since fixed payments remain the same but variable
27(Dis-)economies of scale or scope would however remove this separability. In contrast, congestion
problems or other negative externalities would typically exacerbate the inefficiency by giving each pair
M − Ri an additional incentive to expand its quantity qi (in order to induce R−i to reduce its own
quantity q−i).
Absent antitrust concerns, tariffs contingent on the rival’s price or quantity would also introduce a
link between the two quantity choices. Battigalli et al. (2006) show for example that tariffs with slotting
allowances and contingent on the rival’s quantity yield the monopoly outcome even when quantities are
decided ex post by the manufacturer rather than by the retailers. They then study the implications of
buyer power on the manufacturer’s incentive to maintain quality.
28More precisely, prices will be the same as in “contract equilibria” (see O’Brien and Shaffer (1992)),
where only single-sided deviations are considered. When the manufacturer chooses the terms of the
contracts, however, it may modify both contracts at the same time, which makes the analysis more
complex — when one retailer receives an unexpected offer, it may revise its beliefs concerning the contracts
being offered to its rivals; see Rey and Verge´ (2004) for a discussion of these issues.
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profits are greater). In contrast, contingent contracts allow both M and Ri to be indiffer-
ent between exclusivity or common agency (in the equilibrium mentioned in proposition
4, they jointly get Πmi in both cases), which removes any incentives to deviate to exclusive
dealing. Thus, contingent offers, which we view as a convenient short-cut for reflecting
the renegotiation that changes in market structure would likely trigger, help limit the
scope for profitable deviations from a common agency situation and thus contribute to
make such situations more stable. We suspect that the same insight would carry over to
situations where multiple manufacturers deal with multiple retailers.29
4.3 Ruling Out Negative Payments
In the previous section, we focused on three-part tariffs but other payment schemes could
achieve similar effects:
• A non-linear tariff of the form Ti (qi) = ρi
(
qi, q
M
−i
)
qi + Ui , where as before ρi (qi, q−i)
denotes Ri’s revenue function and Ui ≤ 0 represents an upfront payment by the
manufacturer, would also work. Any attempt by R−i to free-ride on Ri’s sales
would induce Ri not to buy, and upfront payments can again be used to share the
overall profits.
• A more radical solution would consist in “selling” to the manufacturer the right to
determine the tariffs.
• “Classic” two-part tariffs combined with resale price maintenance can also yield
the monopoly outcome. Suppose for example that the wholesale and (imposed)
retail prices are both equal to the monopoly price
(
wi = pi = Pi
(
qMi , q
M
−i
))
. This
eliminates downstream margins and prevents each Ri −M pair from free-riding on
R−i’s margin. In this way, the manufacturer recovers all the industry profits, which
can be redistributed through upfront payments.30
29Rey and Verge´ (2002) study the case where two manufacturers deal with two retailers. They show that,
with non-contingent two-part tariffs, it can be the case that no equilibrium exists where all “channels” are
active, even in situations where each channel could contribute to enhance industry profits. The analysis
of the present paper suggests that allowing for contracts contingent on the market structure (i.e., on
which channels are active) may restore the existence of “double common agency” equilibria. Mouraviev
(2007) analyzes a simplified framework (where the parties decide whether to enter into a relationship)
that supports this conjecture.
30O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) make a similar point. In a situation where a manufacturer offers secret
contracts to two competing retailers, they show that resale price maintenance allows the manufacturer
to eliminate any risk of opportunism by eliminating downstream margins.
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These alternative solutions all involve down payments from the manufacturer to the
retailers.31 However, as we will see now, negative payments are not necessary: even if
tariffs are restricted to be non-negative (i.e., T ∗i (q) ≥ 0 for any q), there exist common
agency equilibria with monopoly prices, in which each retailer earn its contribution to the
industry profits.
Suppose for simplicity that retailers compete a` la Cournot in the downstream market
and define pii (qi, q−i) = ρi (qi, q−i)− cqi . Assume further that pii is continuous, concave
in qi, decreasing in q−i and that quantities are strategic subsitutes, i.e.,
∂2p˜ii
∂qi∂q−i
< 0. By
construction, pii
(
0, qM
−i
)
= 0 , and ΠM − pii
(
qMi , q
M
−i
)
= ρ
−i
(
qM
−i, q
M
i
)
− cqM
−i < Π
m
−i imply-
ing that pii
(
qMi , q
M
−i
)
> ΠM − Πm
−i . By continuity, it follows that there exists a unique
q̂i ∈
]
0, qMi
[
such that pii
(
q̂i, q
M
−i
)
= ΠM −Πm
−i . Consider now the following contracts (for
i = 1, 2):
• If both contracts are accepted (common agency), the relevant tariff takes the fol-
lowing form:32
TCi (q) =

cq if q ≤ q̂i
cq + T if q̂i < q ≤ q
M
i
+∞ if q > qMi
,
where T = Πm
−i − pi−i
(
qM
−i, q
M
i
)
, and is thus positive by construction.
• TEi (q) = cq +Π
m
1 +Π
m
2 − Π
M .
The TEi allows M to secure its equilibrium profit by dealing exclusively with either
retailer, while the tariff TCi is very similar in spirit to the three-part tariff used in propo-
sition 4. It is designed to ensure that any attempt to free-ride on Ri’s sales by increasing
q−i would cause Ri to reduce sharply qi and thus its payment to M . Suppose first that
M accepts both offers and that retailer R−i sells its monopoly quantity q
M
−i. Within each
range [0, q̂i[ and
]
q̂i, q
M
i
]
, Ri obtains the product at marginal cost and would thus be
willing to buy up to more than qMi . It will therefore buy either q̂i or q
M
i . Moreover, it is
indifferent between q̂i and q
M
i , since in both cases it obtains its contribution to industry
31An even more radical solution would be to allow Ri’s offer to be contingent on the terms of M ’s
contract with R−i (or simply on the quantity q−i). However, this type of contract contravenes competition
laws, since it can be seen as a horizontal agreement rather than a purely vertical contract.
32The tariff TC
i
(q) is not only positive but is also such that the manufacturer never sells below cost
(TCi (q) ≥ cq). For q > q
M
i , T
C
i (q) only needs to be large enough to deter the retailer from selling more
than qM
i
(independently of what is done by the rival). For instance, TC
i
(q) > ρi (qi, 0) for q > q
M
i
is
sufficient if the revenue function ρi is decreasing in q−i.
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profits:
ρi
(
q̂i, q
M
−i
)
− TCi (q̂i) = pii
(
q̂i, q
M
−i
)
= ΠM − Πm
−i,
and ρi
(
qMi , q
M
−i
)
− TCi
(
qMi
)
= pii
(
qMi , q
M
−i
)
− T = ΠM −Πm
−i.
There thus exists a continuation equilibrium in which each retailer sells its monopoly
quantity qMi and, together R−i and M obtain Π
m
−i, which is exactly the highest profit
that they could achieve under exclusive dealing. As we have seen earlier, if Ri’s best
response to q−i were smooth, the pair R−i −M would be tempted to free-ride on Ri’s
sales by increasing q−i above q
M
−i. However, since pii (q̂i, q−i)− pii
(
qMi , q−i
)
is increasing in
q−i, such a deviation breaks here the indifference of Ri, who immediately reduces its sales
to (at most) q̂i.This reduces the payment to M down to its production cost, making the
deviation unprofitable since the joint profit of M and Ri becomespi−i (q−i, qi) ≤ Π
m
−i. .
Thus, it is indeed the discontinuity in each retailer’s reaction function that is impor-
tant, not the possible use of slotting allowances. The same applies in the context of Marx
and Shaffer (2007) with non-contingent tariffs. Since slotting allowances are not used
anyway when retailers are equally profitable (Πm1 = Π
m
2 ) , we assume in what follows that
Πm1 > Π
m
2 and show that upfront payments are not needed to achieve exclusivity. As
above, it suffices to pick a tariff such that the exclusive retailer is indifferent in equilib-
rium between the bilateral monopoly quantity and a much smaller one, but would switch
to the latter if its rival were active.
We are thus looking for an equilibrium (with non-negative non-contingent tariffs)
such that (i) there is exclusion, i.e., only R1 is active; and (ii) M and R1 jointly achieve
the bilateral monopoly profit Πm1 , R1 receiving its full contribution, i.e., Π
m
1 −Π
m
2 . The
following tariffs constitute such an equilibrium:
T ∗1 (q) =
{
cq if q ≤ q̂1
cq +Πm2 if q > q̂1
and T ∗2 (q) =
{
0 if q = 0
cq +Πm2 if q > 0
,
where q̂1 is such that pi1 (q̂1, 0) = Π
m
1 −Π
m
2 . Note that such a solution exists and is strictly
lower than the bilateral monopoly quantity qm1 = argmaxq pi1 (q, 0) .
The tariff T ∗1 is designed so that when R2 is inactive, R1 is indifferent between q̂1 and
qm1 . However, since pi1 (q̂1, q2)− pi1 (q
m
1 , q2) is increasing in q2, if R2 were to sell a positive
quantity, R1 would no longer be indifferent and would choose to reduce its sales to (at
most) q̂1, thereby sharply reducing its payment toM. M and Ri would then jointly obtain
pi1 (q1, q2) < Π
m
1 . A similar argument holds for R2 : when R1 is inactive, R2 is indifferent
between buying qm2 and shutting down, but R2 strictly prefers to shut down whenever R1
is active. Therefore, if these tariffs are offered, there exists a continuation equilibrium
where only R1 is active and sells q
m
1 ; whatever set of contracts it accepts, M gets Π
m
2 .
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If R1 offers the tariff T
∗
1 , M and R2 cannot jointly earn more than Π
m
2 (their joint profit
is (at best) Πm2 if only one retailer is active, and maxq2 pi2 (q2, q̂1) < Π
m
2 if both retailers
are active). Therefore, there is no profitable deviation for R2. Suppose now that R2 has
offered the tariff T ∗2 . Since R2 will shut down and withdraw any payment (in particular
the conditional fixed fee Πm2 ) to M, R1 needs to leave at least Π
m
2 to the manufacturer
in order to be active. It can therefore never obtain more than Πm1 −Π
m
2 , which is exactly
what it achieves with T ∗1 , making any deviation unprofitable.
5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis highlights the role of buyer power in affecting the complexity of contracts
that are negotiated between manufacturer and retailers. As mentioned earlier, much of
the literature on vertical contracting assumes that the bargaining power rests upstream.
Yet, in recent years the bargaining power has often shifted towards large retailers. Our
analysis is in line with the observation that retailer buyer power is positively correlated
with the growing importance of more sophisticated contracts than simple two-part tariffs.
Were bargaining power upstream, the industry monopoly outcome could be achieved with
two-part tariffs. Once retailers have some bargaining power, however, two-part tariffs are
no longer sufficient to sustain the industry monopoly outcome, which implies that the less
efficient retailer may be excluded in equilibrium. More sophisticated contracts are thus
needed to maintain monopoly prices and profits.
In particular, these contracts need to be contingent on market structure, otherwise, as
noted by Marx and Shaffer (2007), exclusion of the “least profitable” retailer occurs even
when general tariff structures can be used. We have shown in this paper, that, combining
conditional fixed fees with slotting allowances suffices to sustain the industry monopoly
outcome. This result is robust; in particular, it does not depend on the type of retail
competition (e.g. prices vs. quantities), nor on the amount of retail differentiation or
asymmetry. Even when they are close substitutes, the retailers can commit to maintain
monopoly prices (through adequate wholesale prices) by offering conditional fixed fees
equal to their anticipated profits, and then using slotting allowances to recover from the
manufacturer their contribution to the monopoly profits. Conditioning fixed fees on actual
trade serves as a commitment to “opt out” in case prices become too low and thereby
prevents deviations.33 In contrast to Marx and Shaffer (2007), sophisticated tariffs (e.g.
33An interesting extension would be to allow for less extreme bargaining power. While it is easy to
check that three-part tariffs keep implementing the monopoly outcome for any degree of bargaining power
(with upfront payments that increase with the retailers’ bargaining power), the equilibrium that would
arise with only upfront or conditional payments still needs to be explored.
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with slotting allowances) are used to soften retail competition and generate monopoly
prices instead of to exclude the rival retailer.
However, three-part tariffs are not the only way to achieve the monopoly outcome:
more general non-linear tariffs or two-part tariffs combined with resale price maintenance
could generate the same outcome. More importantly, slotting allowances are not needed
to obtain the result. Contingent tariffs with conditional payments payable only if the
retailer buys more than some threshold quantity can achieve the integrated monopoly
solution, even if one insists on these tariffs being non-negative for all quantities. Similarly,
if contracts are restricted to be non-contingent, exclusion always occurs, but, once again,
slotting allowances are not needed to generate the result.
These results have important implications for competition policy. In particular, they
suggest that competition authorities should adopt an effects-based rather than a form-
based approach. The latter might lead authorities to ban slotting allowances on the
grounds that they harm consumers, either by generating monopoly prices or by allowing
the most profitable retailer to exclude its rival in the case of non-contingent contracts.
Such a ban can however be expected to be ineffective, since firms would sustain the same
equilbrium outcome through other types of tariffs.
Finally, even if some “regulation” were to be introduced, how to design such inter-
vention is a rather complex issue since it is not simple to compare the welfare effects of
different kinds of tariffs. In order to illustrate this point, let us compare the equilibrium
outcomes with two-part tariffs to the ones with three-part or more general tariffs. For
the sake of exposition, we will focus on equilibria that are Pareto-undominated for the
retailers.34 Three-part tariffs (combining conditional fixed fees with slotting allowances)
allow the firms to eliminate competition and sustain the monopoly profits, and retailers
can clearly benefit from this, since (i) they can never get more than their contribution to
industry profits, and (ii) with slotting allowances, they can get their entire contribution
to the industry monopoly profits. We now consider the impact of these tariffs on the
manufacturer, consumers, and total welfare.
When general enough tariffs are allowed, retailers leave Πm1 + Π
m
2 − Π
M to the man-
ufacturer. When instead firms can only negotiate over two-part tariffs, the equilibria
that are Pareto-undominated for the retailers leave either Πm2 or (provided that Π˜ ≥ Π
m
1
)
34The comparison might otherwise be less meaningful. In particular, the class of contracts that are
considered would not affect the manufacturer’s preferred (trembling-hand perfect) equilibrium, since: (i)
the manufacturer can always get Πm2 in an exclusive dealing equilibrium; (ii) in any common agency
equilibrium, the manufacturer must be indifferent between accepting both offers or only R2’s exclusive
dealing offer; and (iii) in any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, R2 cannot offer an exclusive dealing
contract that gives more than Πm2 to the manufacturer.
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Πm1 +Π
m
2 − Π˜ to the manufacturer. Sophisticated tariffs (e.g., slotting allowances) thus
unambiguously reduce the manufacturer’s profit, since ΠM > Πm1 , and:
Πm1 +Π
m
2 − Π
M = Πm2 −
(
ΠM − Πm1
)
< Πm2 −max
[
0, Π˜− Πm1
]
.
Therefore, while the retailers would be willing to use slotting allowances, the manufacturer
might object to such a move.
The impact of sophisticated contracts on consumer surplus and total welfare is more
ambiguous. On the one hand, if both retailers carry the manufacturer’s product any-
way (i.e. when Π˜ ≥ Πm1
)
, reducing competition harms consumers and thus reduces total
welfare. On the other hand, if sophisticated tariffs avoid the complete elimination of a
competitor, they are socially desirable.
To assess further the desirability of general tariffs, it is therefore necessary to identify
factors that influence whether exclusion is likely or not, which hinges on the comparison
between Π˜ and Πm1 . One would expect Π˜ to be higher than Π
m
1 when the retailers are
highly differentiated. Indeed, if the retailers are in independent markets, then ΠM =
Πm1 + Π
m
2 and, in addition, the pair Ri −M no longer has an incentive to free-ride on
R−i’s sales (in particular, Assumption A2 does not hold), so that the equilibrium profit is
equal to the monopoly profit: Π˜ = ΠM ; therefore, Π˜ > Πm1 , implying that both retailers
can be active even if only two-part tariffs can be used. If instead retailers are perfect
substitutes, Π˜ < Πm1 = Π
M , implying that exclusion necessarily occurs when general
tariffs are ruled out. Banning sophisticated tariffs is therefore more likely to induce
exclusion when products are less differentiated.
A similar analysis can be carried out concerning the relative strengths of the retailers:
the inequality Π˜ < Πm1 is more likely to hold when one retailer contributes much more
than the other to the industry profit (that is, Πm1 close to Π
M); thus, symmetry may
render exclusion less likely.
In order to explore this question further, we now consider linear inverse demand func-
tions given by:
P1 (q1, q2) = 1−
(1− α) q1 − σq2
1− σ
and P2 (q1, q2) = 1−
(1 + α) q2 − σq1
1− σ
,
where α, σ ∈ [0, 1[ and α + σ < 1, and normalize the production cost to c = 0. The
parameter α measures the asymmetry between the two retailers (retailers are equally
profitable when α = 0, while R1 becomes relatively larger than R2 as α increases) while σ
represents the degree of substitutability between the retailers (retailers face independent
demands when σ = 0, while they become closer substitutes as σ increases). The condition
α + σ < 1 ensures that both retailers are needed to maximize industry profits (i.e., that
the industry monopoly outcome assigns a positive quantity for R2).
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The results obtained with this specification are illustrated in figures 1 and 2. Figure
1 shows the range of parameter values for which common agency equilibria exist with
two-part tariffs, for the cases of quantity (bold line) and price (dashed line) competition.
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Figure 1: Pareto-undominated equilibrium outcomes with two-part tariffs
This figure confirms the previous insights: exclusion is more likely when retailers are
close substitutes (σ high) and/or relatively asymmetric (α high), that is, when α + σ is
close to its upper bound; as retailers become more differentiated or more symmetric (i.e.,
as either σ or α decrease), equilibria appear where both retailers are active. Figure 1 also
shows that both retailers are more likely to be active when they compete in prices rather
than in quantities. Compared with quantity competition, price competition is as usual
more aggressive and thus results in lower retail margins. But this reduces here eachM−Ri
pair’s incentives to free-ride on the rival’s sales, thereby increasing the profits achieved
in the candidate common agency equilibrium, which in turn decreases the likelihood of
exclusion: Π˜ is higher, and thus more likely to exceed Πm1 , in the case of price competition.
Figure 2 shows the impact on consumer surplus of a restriction to two-part tariffs for
the case of quantity competition (results are qualitatively the same for price competition
and for total welfare).
Restricting attention to two-part tariffs harms consumers (and society) when it leads to
exclusive dealing. However, as already oberved, this is more likely to occur when retailers
are good substitutes and/or rather asymmetric (high values of σ and/or α), which is
precisely when the exclusion of the weaker retailer is socially less costly. As a result, the
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Figure 2: Impact of consumer surplus of a restriction to two-part tariffs
magnitude of such harm tends to be lower than that of the benefits of having somewhat
competitive prices when two-part tariffs do not generate exclusion.
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